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Abstract
The need for physically motivated discreteness and finiteness conditions emerges in models of both analog and digital computing
that are genuinely concerned with physically realizable computational processes. This is brought out by a critical examination of
notional analog superTuring devices which involve physically untenable idealizations about the perfect functioning of analog
apparatuses and infinite precision of physical measurements. The capability for virtual behaviour, that is, the capability of
interpreting, storing, transforming, creating the code, and thereby mimicking the behaviour of (Turing) machines, is used here to
introduce a new dimension in the discussion of the analog–digital watershed. In the light of recent results on the analog simulation
of digital computing, we examine the role of virtuality as a discriminating factor between these two species of computing, and
immerse this problem in the context of natural computing. Is virtuality instantiated in parts of the natural world other than computer
technology? This broad issue is examined in connection with the computational modelling of brain and mental information
processing.
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1. Introduction
By appeal to limitations of human memory and perception, Turing argued that human computation processes meet
distinctive discreteness and finiteness constraints [27]. These constraints (D–F conditions from now on) are reflected
into the definition of a Turing machine.1 In the same work, Turing established the existence of (and actually exhibited
a program for) a universal computing device. At the heart of the universal Turing machine are the capability of
interpreting the code and mimicking the behaviour of Turing machines, that is, distinctive features of (what we call
here) the virtuality property.
In theories of analog computing, D–F conditions that are specific to the Turing model of computation are violated,
and an investigation of the virtuality property is usually unattended to, on the ground that analog computations do
not involve the execution of symbolic instructions. It turns out, however, that physically motivated D–F conditions do
play a subtle role in physically acceptable models of analog computers. This is brought out by a critical examination
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of notional analog superTuring devices, where the use of exact real quantities appears to be crucial to achieve non-
Turing behaviour. The mathematical models of these devices involve physically untenable idealizations about the
perfect functioning of analog apparatuses and infinite precision of physical measurements. Accordingly, in models of
analog computing that are genuinely concerned with physically realizable calculation processes, these idealizations
are to be dropped and replaced by physically motivated D–F constraints.
The virtuality property of the universal Turing machine was a major source of inspiration for early design
efforts into general-purpose stored program computers [7]; and it provides theoretical underpinning for present-day
programming practice too. It is the absence of full-fledged virtual behaviour, rather than the absence of D–F conditions,
which seems to provide a watershed between models of analog computing and the Turing model. Virtuality is achieved
in universal Turing machines on the basis of the effective and invertible coding of Turing machines. Coding and
interpretation of machine programs seem prima facie to play no role in analog computing, even though simulation and
general-purpose I/O behaviour are clearly in the scope of the latter. This is nicely illustrated, in the way of general-
purpose, albeit non-universal, behaviour by the fact that every class En in the Grzegorczyk hierarchy of primitive
recursive functions is dynamical-systems computable [3]: every such class contains, for n > 2, the universal function
for the immediately lower class [15].
Finally, we point out that the virtuality property brings out a major conceptual and empirical issue about the proper
use of analog artificial neural networks as modelling tools in the computational neurosciences. There are cognitive
capacities that are naturally accounted for in terms of the virtuality property, but hardly any trace of this property is
found in (models of) the brain. This is argued for by reference to mental arithmetic, introspection, and other symbolic
capacities.
2. D–F conditions and effectiveness
A variety of informally stated and differently motivated D–F conditions are introduced as distinguishing features
of algorithms [18, pp. 1–5], human computation processes [27], and digital computing at large, insofar as a digital
computation process is described by means of a sequence s0, s1, . . . of states, and each state s j is in its turn described
in finite terms by means of discrete variables. Gandy provided an analysis of digital computation processes leading
to D–F restrictive conditions which generalize Turing’s D–F conditions for “rule of thumb” calculations carried
out by human beings. He also showed that the functions computable by any device satisfying these generalized
D–F conditions are Turing computable [12]. Sieg gave an axiomatic presentation of Gandy’s D–F conditions and
established an appropriate representation theorem: any process carried out by a model of the axioms (that is, a “Gandy
machine”) can be simulated by a Turing machine [22]. One of these axioms expresses a principle of local action, which
is justified by appeal to special relativity. Local action applies, for the same physical motive, to analog computing too.
Can one identify other physically motivated D–F constraints on analog computations?
To prepare the ground for exploring this question, let us preliminarily consider whether there are objects in the
physical world which satisfy Gandy’s D–F conditions: is there any genuine digital computer in the physical world?
According to physical theory, quantum behaviour is the only source of genuine discreteness in the physical
world. Some quantum features have been caused to become manifest at the macroscopic level: superconductivity,
magnetic flux quantization, Hall effect, Bose–Einstein condensates, spintronics, Josephson effect, etc. There are some
computational applications of these quantum features, e.g. quantum gates, but presently these applications extend
no further than very limited combinatorial nets. No computational use is made of the ultimately quantum nature of
physical devices which make up current computational machinery. The macroscopic variables one uses to describe
computational devices are continuous, and the laws governing their behaviour are of an algebraic or analytic nature.
Indeed, the required discretization, or strong non-linearity, is contrived via positive feedback and other circuital or
constructional devices. This state of affairs is concisely summarized in Grac¸a et al. [14, p. 170]: “Even the physical
model underlying digital computers is analytic although their behaviour is idealized as discrete”. A similar distinction
was introduced by Turing when answering the above question about the existence of genuine digital machinery in the
world. Strictly speaking, he claimed, there is no such thing as a discrete state machine, since “everything really moves
continuously”. But he was prompt to add: “there are many kinds of machine which can profitably be thought of as
being discrete state machines” [28, p. 439, our emphasis].
We take these various observations to mean that abstraction from continuous physical motion enables one to achieve
theoretical simplicity without loss of significant information in certain explanatory or predictive contexts. Epistemic
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motivations of this sort are generally adduced for discretizing physical variables. A variable is discrete or quantized
if
(i) it takes real values within mutually disjoint intervals that are separated by non-zero measure intervals,
(ii) the intervals can be put in correspondence with a countable set, and
(iii) the particular value taken on by the variable within an interval is of no empirical or theoretical consequence.
The last condition expresses the properly epistemic requirement for discretization: nothing in the way of empirical
or theoretical adequacy is lost by substituting the discrete variable for a continuous one. Physical circumstances
enabling one to fulfill this epistemic condition are exploited in the technical realization of discrete electronics. These
circumstances predominantly concern circuit topology enabling non-runaway positive feedback in flip-flops or shape
forming circuits (as in Schmitt triggers), and so on. By exploiting these circumstances one forces, as it were, a
classical physical system to behave (with high probability) as a digital one. Of course such systems must be robust
under iteration, i.e. they must comply with the so-called stability dogma. Thus, in particular, a flip-flop transistor can
profitably be thought of as a digital system insofar as only its attractor states matter in a wide variety of explanatory
or predictive tasks.
In analog computing, one computes with classical physical systems without forcing them to behave as digital
systems. Accordingly, the epistemic requirement for discretization is irrelevant to theories of analog computing. The
origin of the term ‘analog’ is rooted in methods that were initially adopted to implement analog computers. Electronic,
mechanical, fluidic, etc. devices were connected in such a way that the functional description of the resulting apparatus
A coincided with or approximated a differential system T to be integrated. Often, but by no means in principle, system
T models the behaviour of some other physical system P , so that A and P are both described by T . Historically, the
system A was built as an analogue of some physical system P , hence the name. And indeed analog computers have
been used for design purposes in the simulation of systems that are too complex and difficult to experiment with in real
world situations (going as far back in time as the tide prediction systems built by Lord Kelvin out of springs, levers,
and other mechanical components). Moreover, analog computers have been used as direct controlling agents for some
external system (e.g., automatic piloting, avionics, plant control, etc.). But in the end, analog computers are to be
regarded as computing devices performing symbol processing, insofar as they are used to find solutions to numerical
problems usually associated with differential equations. In analog computers, numerical values can be extracted by
measuring the value of some physical quantity, typically a voltage. From the viewpoint of this intended use, analog
computers are on a par with present-day software packages like MATLAB, Mathematica, Maple V, and so on.
If analog and digital computation are two species of the genus computation, one can sensibly ask whether “the
greater expressive power of the continuum” enables one to use analog computers in order to go extensionally beyond
the limits of Turing machines. An examination of mathematical results allegedly bearing on this problem enables us
to bring out the need for physically motivated D–F restrictions in models of analog computing which are concerned
with physically realizable calculation processes.
3. Analog superTuring devices and physical realizability
Models of continuous dynamical systems expressed as ordinary differential equations (ODEs) or hybrid systems
(combining discrete and continuous dynamics) have been characterized and mutually compared according to whether
systems described by these models match or even surpass the I/O behaviours of Turing machines and other automata
[2,13]. Similar mathematical inquiries have been carried out in connection with models of recurrent artificial neural
networks (RANNs) which admit rational or continuous states and weights [24]. Models allowing for non-Turing
behaviours were found in each of these systematic investigations. The conceptual significance of these investigations
need not depend on whether the non-Turing behaviours described by these models are physically acceptable. However,
it has been openly suggested that some such systems disclose the possibility of superTuring sources in the physical
world [23,6]. These suggestions motivate the introduction of distinctive idealizations about the perfect functioning of
analog apparatuses and infinite precision of physical measurements.
Physical idealizations that are involved in conjectures about physical superTuring sources were identified in John
Myhill’s informative discussion2 of the possibility of constructing an analog machine which will print a sequence
2 In a mimeographed report [17] distributed during a lecture course held by John Myhill at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor in 1966.
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t (0), t (1), t (2), . . . , of natural numbers, where t (n) is not a Turing-computable total function. Myhill examined a
number of different approaches to this problem. One of these – building on a result in Scarpellini [20] which was
recently examined from the physical superTuring perspective in Scarpellini [21] – Myhill regarded as the more
promising suggestion for constructing a superTuring analog device solely using conventional analog equipment
(adders, multipliers, integrators, and so on). Scarpellini introduced the notion of representation of predicates of the
integers by means of analytic functions. Such representations allow the expression of the predicates in the following
form:
S =
{
n|
∫ 2x
0
h(x) cos(nx)dx > 0
}
. (1)
For an appropriate h(x), S is a non-recursive set, and therefore S is algorithmically undecidable. Nevertheless, one
might be able to effectively decide, for all n, whether n ∈ S by evaluating analogically the integral and detecting
whether its value is exactly zero or not. In connection with this possibility, Myhill discussed the analog computability
of the function h(x), and was very careful to note that some idealizations are required “in order to make Scarpellini’s
work a basis for constructing an actual computer which can solve problems which are not digitally (= recursively)
solvable” [17, p. 12]. In particular, one has to assume
(1) the perfect functioning of analog components;
(2) The existence of a perfect sensing mechanism — more specifically, the existence of a perfect zero sensor, i.e., a
discontinuous physical device.
Both idealizations (Id1 and Id2 from now on) introduce, as noted by Myhill, drastic simplifications about the interplay
between physical processes occurring in an analog computation, theoretical models of those physical processes,
and operations of physical measurement. Let us expand on Myhill’s observation, by distinguishing three different
components in the meaning of the expression ‘perfect functioning’.
The first of these components is explicated by reference to the notion of physical law: in this case ‘perfect
functioning’ means that the analog components behave in full conformity with whatever physical laws govern their
behaviour. Thus, in particular, any difference in the values of the continuous variables occurring in these physical laws,
no matter how small, corresponds to an objective difference in the configuration of the analog system. The second
component involves reference to a blueprint of the analog equipment. In this case, ‘perfect functioning’ means that
the system behaves in full conformity to the intended blueprint of the analog equipment. Again, an arbitrarily small
deviation from the blueprint is imperfect functioning. (But notice that imperfect functioning is here nothing but perfect
functioning according to a different, possibly unknown blueprint.) The third component amounts to a special ceteris
paribus condition: ‘perfect functioning’ means absence of random perturbations, essentially thermal noise, which in
real physical environments interact with the system in unknown and uncontrollable ways.
The first two components in the meaning of the expression ‘perfect functioning’ bring out readily an ontological
commitment embodied in Id1: any difference, no matter how small, in the values of the continuous variables by means
of which the analog system is described corresponds to an objective difference in the system itself. This ontological
commitment is consistent with a standard picture of what happens in real-world measurement processes of the physical
magnitudes that are referred to in theoretical descriptions of mechanical or electronic analog adders, multipliers or
integrators. However, this ontological commitment is not forced upon us by the observable consequences of these
theoretical descriptions, for the values of any physical magnitude can be measured up to some finite approximation
only. Thus, in general, observational outcomes do agree up to a certain finite approximation, but do not coincide with
the purportedly precise values assigned to a physical magnitude by some theoretical model of analog equipment. The
third component in the meaning of the expression ‘perfect functioning’ is to be attended to in a proper evaluation
of the agreement between theory and observation in the context of repeated measurements of the same physical
quantity. Indeed, thermal effects and other disturbing factors (by which we understand, in accordance with the second
component above, the exact compliance of the given analog device with another blueprint than the one intended for
computation) will change in unknown ways the successive measurement outcomes. A series of such measurements
will end up into a population of different measured values. Therefore, one only has effective access to physical
quantities through statistical populations.
Let us now turn to Id2. This condition involves both a specialization of Id1 to a particular value of some physical
magnitude and the requirement that this value can be discriminated from any other value of the same physical
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magnitude. Id1 is indeed presupposed by Id2: an exact zero detection instrument would not make sense in the absence
of exact values of physical quantities. However, no contradiction seems to arise from the conjunction of Id1 and the
negation of Id2: it might well be the case that physical quantities assume exact values, even though this fact is not
physically detectable.
Let us now bring these observations to bear on the problem of actually building (or even just finding empirical
evidence for) superTuring sources in the physical world.
First, the unavoidable occurrence of a final measurement in any analog computation process rules out the existence
of ‘pure’ analog systems, for the measurement operation maps the possibly infinitely precise value of the analog
variable onto a finite interval. Only hybrid devices can be actually used to compute some output value. In other
words, physically meaningful analog computing is essentially hybrid, insofar as a discrete component is needed to
effectively extract an output. The necessity of a discrete component in any analog computing device depends on the
finite precision of arbitrary physical measurements. It is worth noting that the justification Turing offered for the
finiteness of symbol types in Turing machine computations involves a specialization of the above physical limitation
to human sensory apparatuses: human computing agents cannot discriminate symbols which differ from each other to
an arbitrarily small extent.3
Second, it is implausible that one can build on Scarpellini’s work towards a physically realizable and yet non-
recursive computation by hybrid devices. Both Id1 and Id2 are needed there, for infinite precision is required in
evaluating analogically certain definite integrals and discriminating between the values a = 0 assumed by them, and
every other value a > 0, no matter how small the difference between a and 0 is. The conceptual problems involved in
using Scarpellini’s result as a basis for constructing a superTuring analog device are readily brought to bear on similar
speculations about more recent mathematical models of superTuring sources: none of the approaches examined in
comprehensive reviews [6,25] seems to suggest a promising strategy to cope with both Id1 and Id2.
Third, let us note that the logical relationships between Id1 and Id2 suggest an approach to analog non-Turing
behaviours in the physical world which relies on Id1 only. This possibility is briefly discussed in Siegelmann [23],
in connection with a class of RANNs with real weights which is shown to include all discrete languages: the exact
values of real weights are used there, taking advantage of trivial cardinality properties4 as information enabling one
to decide every set of natural numbers. Siegelmann suggests that this use of exact real weights does not differ from
the use of continuous variables in physical theories. This fact, in her view, commits one to endorse the ontological
assumption embodied in Id1. However, no argument is provided to make up for the lack of experimental access to
these purportedly exact values.5
Scarpellini makes a related speculative suggestion in retrospective comments on the import of his 1963 result on
the understanding of brain mechanisms:
. . . it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the brain may rely on analogue processes for certain types of
computation and decision-making. Possible candidates which may give rise to such processes are the axons
of nerve cells . . . it is conceivable that the mathematics of a collection of axons may lead to undecidable
propositions like those discussed in my paper [21].
This suggestion makes an essential appeal to the third component in the meaning of ‘perfect functioning’
considered above, disregarding the fact that in real physical environments random perturbations, essentially thermal
noise, are bound to interact with the brain in unknown and uncontrollable ways. Indeed, the requirement of robustness
to bounded noise in analog computing rules out the use of exact real quantities to obtain non-Turing behaviour.
Notably, non-Turing behaviour is excluded in robust RANNs, which can only recognize regular languages [4,5].
To sum up: We have seen, on the one hand, that physically motivated D–F restrictions arise in models of analog
computing which afford physical realization. We have noted, on the other hand, the difficulty of thoroughly grounding
in classical physics D–F conditions on digital computing. Indeed, in a “digital” artefact one may identify a stratification
3 “I shall also suppose that the number of symbols which may be printed is finite. If we were to allow an infinity of symbols, then there would
be symbols differing to an arbitrarily small extent” [27, p. 249].
4 See the pertinent observations in Davis [8, sect. 4].
5 Indeed, the following claim is advanced with no special qualification: “In nature, the fact that the constants are not known to us, or cannot even
be measured, is irrelevant for the true evolution of the system. For example, the planets revolve according to the exact values of G, p, and their
masses” [23, p. 59].
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of levels where the bottom one is analog, i.e. its theory is couched satisfactorily in terms of continuous variables and
ODEs of classical physics. Some such systems exploit – as pointed out in section 2 – specific controlled physical
circumstances, and are thereby universally interpreted as digital systems which give rise to levels of digital processing
built upon the analog substratum. Actual computing machinery (CPUs, RAMs, etc.) is indeed analog machinery
although of that particular sort licensing the above digital interpretation.
Let us now turn to consider the distinction between analog and digital in the light of the virtuality property.
4. Virtuality (and brain processing)
In computer science there is no precise definition of the notions of virtuality and virtual behaviour. One usually
appeals to a cluster of closely related features to describe types of virtual behaviour and types of machines which
exhibit virtual behaviour. Notably, these features concern the possibility of interpreting, storing, transforming, and
creating computer program code. Indeed, these features were appealed to in the context of use of the more specialized
notions of virtual memory and virtual hardware that were introduced to describe the IBM /360 machines of the 1960’s,
and the related terminology of multiple machine, multiple virtual space, multiple address space, etc. This conceptual
ancestry is to be ascribed also to the notion of virtual machine, as it occurs in the domain of Operating Systems,
and to the Java virtual machine. No reference seems to be ever made in these contexts of inquiry to the theoretical
underpinning of virtuality in computability theory. This is ultimately provided by the effective enumerability of the
partial recursive functions (as expressed in Kleene’s Normal Form theorem).
A significant consequence of the effective enumerability of the partial recursive functions is indeed the capability
of interpreting, transforming, and running machines which are present, as it were, only under their code (program)
aspect. In particular, distinctive features of the notion of virtuality that directly take their origin in computability
theory are the capability for modifying machine code and the capability for simulating the behaviour of any member
of some given class of computing machines by interpreting the stored code of the machine to simulate. One should
carefully note here, in the context of both computer science practice and its theoretical grounding, that there is a sharp
distinction between interpretation – the hallmark of virtuality – and other forms of mimicking and simulating, insofar
as interpretation involves more than exact, i.e. step by step identical, replication of the machine workings carried out
by the “mimicked” entity: it does require the existence and use of a code or program of the simulated machine, which
can be stored and which the simulating machine accepts as an additional or control variable. By taking advantage of
this mechanism, a computing machine possessing the virtuality property can simulate up to countably many machines
and carry out up to countably many functional mappings.
The capability of modifying machine code so as to obtain a different machine, under its code aspect, is exemplified
by the algorithm used in the proof of Kleene’s parameter (or s-m-n) theorem, while the recursion theorems [18, Chap.
11] exemplify a crucial, albeit elusive, facet of virtuality, which is widely recognized, but difficult to characterize from
an ontological point of view.6 It is the fact that a code (a program) is on a par with (has the same nature as) the other
variables the machine processes as “regular” variables. In the particular embodiment of current machinery, this nature
is both text and memory content. Indeed, in the recursion theorems the variables are meant to be regular I/O variables
or Go¨del numbers, according to context.
Recent results show that analog computers are indeed capable of (robustly) simulating any Turing machine. In
particular, work by Branicky and Grac¸a [2,13] and especially Grac¸a et al. [14] show that the I/O behaviour of Turing
machines is simulated by analog computers, that such simulation is robust,7 and furthermore that such simulation of
I/O behaviour is obtained via the stepwise simulation of the operation of the Turing machine.
We surmise that these simulation results do not, by themselves, suffice to establish a full-fledged capability for vir-
tual behaviour in analog computing. Indeed, the search for full-fledged virtual behaviour in analog computers gives rise
to a wider variety of related questions: is there an analog computer (say, a GPAC) which, provided with a description
6 This difficulty reflects limitations in our current understanding of the notions of hardware and software and their mutual relationships.
7 Since these I/O Turing behaviours are achieved by means of robust analog devices, no appeal is to be made in Grac¸a et al. [14] to the perfect
functioning of analog components (Id1), or to the existence of perfect sensor mechanisms (Id2), whereas both Id1 and Id2 appear to be needed, in
the light of the above discussion, to achieve analog superTuring behaviour. The intuitive notion of robustness was given a precise explication in
order to obtain the above results. A notion of perturbed Turing machine and a corresponding notion of robustness were introduced and explored
in Asarin and Bouajjani [1]. It turns out that Turing machines that are robust under perturbation cannot achieve superTuring behaviour either. We
surmise that requesting robustness in analog computation is akin to requesting effectiveness in algorithmic computation.
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of some analog computer as input, returns (the code of) another analog computer as output? Is it possible for this out-
put code to be “interpreted” or “executed” by some other GPAC? Is it possible for the functional unknown of an ODE
to act back on the parameters of the ODE itself? Similar questions arise about the possibility of storing and retrieving,
for execution at later times, analog machine descriptions. Pending (positive) answers to such questions, possession of
full-fledged virtuality seems to afford, in the present state of our knowledge, a watershed between digital and analog
computing, and enables one to isolate characteristic features of what one may generically call algorithmic computing.
Using results of Grac¸a et al. [14], a single real-valued initial condition can be made to encode the program of
a universal Turing machine together with its input. As this initial condition may “contain” the code of any Turing
machine, there is a sense in which a universal analog computer, starting on such initial condition, can simulate
any Turing machine. However, on closer inspection, what turns out to be the case is that the universal analog
computer simulates stepwise the universal Turing machine, which in its turn simulates the Turing machine whose
code is “contained” in the initial condition. This is to be contrasted with a more properly analog notion of virtuality,
wherein the universal analog computer simulates any analog computer. Speculatively, one may envisage a scheme
for implementing virtuality in analog computing as follows. The scheme would imply analog machinery which upon
the giving of a blueprint of an analog computer constructs it up and runs it. This constructing machinery might be
instructed by means of some memory device to be added to the range of components of analog computers. And this
memory device, in turn, might be written, stored, and acted upon as an effect of analog computing actions, thereby
obtaining true virtuality. But an analog computer with such features would start looking very much like a digital
computer, with the analytic part losing importance with respect to the switching and configuring one. After all, as
noticed in Section 2 above, digital computers are analog computers.
Now, is full-fledged virtuality physically instantiated in parts of the natural world other than man-made digital
computing technology? In particular, does the brain, qua information processing system, possess the virtuality
property?
In addressing this question, one can hardly benefit from algorithmic investigations into biological neural processing
(in the wake of, say, the early modelling efforts by McCulloch and Pitts), for the modelling of biological networks
via ANNs in contemporary neuroscience is mostly, in the light of the above discussion, of the computational but
non-algorithmic kind. Thus, in particular, the problem does not arise there of identifying virtual areas of algorithmic
programming, whereby the physical memory location of a piece of information is irrelevant to execution, while that
information may dynamically occur in different environments at the same time. In a special-purpose architecture, as
the CNS has been up to now modeled via ANNs, this multiplicity cannot be made dynamical and dependent on current
inputs: it must be preordered at construction time and accessed via a switching process which involves operations that
are quite different from the loading of yet another instance of the same identical code. The introduction of “modules”
in theoretical accounts of CNS behaviour does not provide a solution to this problem, pending further analysis of the
discipline of their being called into operation. A module is not dynamically called in the same way as a subroutine or a
Java method can; in particular, a module does not call itself recursively as allowed in systems manifesting full-fledged
virtuality. Is the brain machinery really “virtuality-free”? And if so, what is it there that makes up for the agility of
unconstrained computability theory and the related software practice that has made decades of AI work possible?
The positive evidence, if any, one can adduce for virtuality in biological nervous systems is rather speculative
and exclusively of the functional kind, as it concerns candidate explanations of cognitive capacities observed or
hypothesized in humans and other primates. Mental arithmetic, introspection, and mind reading are cases in point
that we consider very briefly now in concluding this note.
First, let us consider symbolic behaviours of humans, of which natural language performance and arithmetic
computing are the foremost. The huge gap between manifest behaviour and what is known in this regard about
CNS functioning is an acutely felt problem in the cognitive neurosciences. It has been recently argued [9] that the
vast symbol processing capabilities of the human brain, including recursion involved in doing mental arithmetic,
can be accounted for neither by evolutionary adaptation (because of temporal constraints), nor by learning (because
of staggering uniformity between individuals). The alternative “neuronal recycling” hypothesis put forward there
suggests that brain architecture allows for the rapid development of new specific functionalities [9, p. 147] in brain
areas previously devoted to performing other functional tasks. Dehaene’s hypothetical recycling is deemed to act on
time scales which are characteristic of learning processes. If this recycling were found to occur at a time scale which
is comparable with the reaction times of the CNS, then brain areas involved into the recycling might very well be
considered to be virtual machines.
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Second, the phenomenology of reflection includes so-called Higher Order Thoughts (HOT), or thinking about
thinking (see [19, p. 249] for a telling discussion). HOTs are widely discussed in Cognitive Science literature, but no
suggestions concerning their actual brain implementation has been advanced. It seems hard to theorize about these
symbolic processes without making appeal to a computational competence which includes full-fledged virtuality.
Appeal to the latter would enable one to provide an account in terms of the duplication of a procedure within
a procedure. Third, let us consider so-called Simulation Theory of Mind (STM), advanced to explain how one
understands the intentions of conspecific individuals. The STM explanation involves some sort of simulation of the
other individual’s behaviour starting from some form of trigger recognition. This functional explanation is consistent
with findings on mirror neurons [11], and recently accrued evidence suggesting that the “vocabulary or grammar” of
actions and body postures in monkeys “is much larger than previously thought” [16, p. 195]. Again, this is readily
accounted for in terms of an interpreter of programs activated by those early triggering recognition events, rather than
by appealing to a large number of anatomically separated, special-purpose systems or modules.
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